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Introduction 
The role of forensic psychology in litigation has grown exponentially in recent decades.  
At present, psychological experts are utilized in a wide variety of practice areas; testifying in 
criminal court, evaluating plaintiffs in workers compensation cases, presenting findings in the 
child custody context, and myriad others.1  In criminal cases, forensic psychologists are crucial 
in determining competency to stand trial and can serve as the fulcrum in insanity defense and 
diminished capacity cases.  Experts can testify on behalf of either party or, somewhat uniquely, 
neither party and instead at the behest of the court.2  Such cases, where an expert is appointed by 
the court, are more often seen in pretrial competency hearings and present their own set of 
unique ethical dilemmas.3 
 In the criminal context, the testimony of psychological experts often plays a pivotal role.   
Typically, experts evaluate defendants.  Most notably, an expert psychologist or psychiatrist is 
employed in determining if a defendant is competent to stand trial, or in support of or opposition 
to an insanity, diminished capacity, or other similar defense.4  With competency in particular, the 
opinion of the expert is paramount; determinations are rarely contested and the expert is asked to 
reach a conclusion as to competency.5  Additionally, psychological experts have been used to 
evaluate other parties in the criminal realm.  One such utilization of a psychological expert is to 
impeach the credibility of witnesses.6  However, such instances are rare and typically subject to 
 
1 Novotney, Helping Courts and Juries Make Educated Decisions APA Monitor on Psychology 
48, 70 (2017)  
2 e.g. Alaska Stat. § 12.47.070 
3 APA, Protecting Patient Privacy When the Court Calls, APA Continuing Education Vol. 47, 7 
(2016) 
4 Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence In Criminal Trials, William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 40, 7 
(1998) 
5 18 USCS § 4241 
6 Id. at 14 
2 
 
some level of scrutiny.7  While superficially similar, the role of the expert is vastly different in 
instances where capacity is at issue as opposed to in cases of certain defenses.  The methods 
employed also vary greatly based on the specific purpose of the expert in question. 
Regardless of which particular methods are employed, there are some inconsistencies 
between jurisdictions and even within jurisdictions.8  These arise out of differences in state and 
federal law and differences individual judges.  Along with concerns over inconsistencies is the 
uneasiness accompanied by a system of unstructured and often disorganized credentialing.9  
Some of these issues arise out of the nature of mental health evaluation.  The testability of 
theories and evaluation can often be called into question because of the differences between 
psychological evaluation and expert testimony in so called ‘hard sciences.’  Even more closely 
related medical experts do not encounter the same set of difficulties.  While an expert in a hard 
science or medicine can fall back on readily verifiable truths, psychological examinations 
involve the systematic testing of hypothesis after hypothesis and “rarely will the thoughtful 
psychiatrist regard this hypothesis as a statement of factual ‘truth.”10 
Even still, it is important to note that the place of psychological experts in court is well 
settled.  Legislators have gone as far as requiring psychological experts to play a role particularly 
when competency is at issue.11  However, aforementioned issues regarding inconsistency and 
 
7 See State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1125 (LA 1993) 
8 Rogers, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice J Am Acad 
Psychiatry Law 37, 451 (2009) 
9 Otto, Training and Credentialing in Forensic Psychology, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 
Vol. 8, 218 (1990) 
10 Showalter, Distinguishing Science From Pseudo-Science In Psychiatry: Expert Testimony in 
The Post-Daubert Era, 2 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 211, 229 (1995) 
11 e.g. Alaska Stat. § 12.47.070 
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credentialing, as well as problems with uniformity in employed methodology does call into 
question the credence of some psychological testimony even in a post-Daubert landscape.   
Competency to stand trial is critical in any criminal proceeding.  Competency 
determinations have been called "the most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the 
system of criminal law"12  Often, the issue presents itself early on in the process.  Courts find a 
defendant incompetent if they “presently…suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering 
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”13  Such a 
determination is vital as trying an incompetent defendant is a due process violation.14  While 
jurisdictions differ as to the specifics of competency testing, the determination is typically 
predicated on a court-appointed expert’s evaluation and corresponding report.15  As with any 
expert, these evaluators are held to the Daubert standard federally and in certain jurisdictions. 
 
Frye, Daubert, and Competency 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines the boundaries of expert testimony.  
The rule allows “a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education [to] testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise” in instances where “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or determine a fact in issue.” 
 
12 Pirelli, A Meta-Analytic Review of Competency To Stand Trial Research, 17 Psych. Pub. Pol. 
And L. 1, 2 (2011) 
13 18 USCS § 4241 
14 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) 
15  Kaplan, The Forensic Psychology Report, ABA (2018)   
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Previously, the determination of who qualified as an expert was based on the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Frye v. US.  The Court in Frye based its determination on the acceptability of 
the proposed expert’s methods and determinations within the relevant scientific community.16  In 
looking at “scientific recognition” the Frye court left the greater scientific community as the 
gatekeeper of expertise.  While Frye remained intact after rule 702’s passing the Court moved 
away from this approach beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals in 1993. In 
Daubert, the Court downplayed the importance of the scientific community holding that, while 
“general acceptance” remains relevant to whether or not a proposed witness is an expert, it is one 
of many factors to determine an expert’s admissibility.17  Doing so removed the scientific 
community as gatekeepers of expertise and placed that responsibility in the hands of judges.  
Instead of relying on general acceptability, judges were to weigh several factors in making their 
determinations.  The Court included a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider such as: whether 
the expert’s technique or theory can be tested and assessed for reliability, whether the technique 
or theory has been subject to peer review and publication, the known or potential rate of error of 
the technique or theory, and the existence and maintenance of standards and controls, along with 
the existing “general acceptability in the scientific community” standard.18 
Daubert gave the gatekeeping function in the expert witness context to judges.  It also 
noted that challenges to a ruling either excluding or allowing expert testimony were reviewed 
with the deferential abuse of discretion standard.19  This, along with the holding serve to 
complicate matters for forensic psychological experts.  “For mental health experts, the practical 
 
16 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 





effect of this ruling is that different trial judges within the same jurisdiction may legitimately 
reach opposite conclusions about the admissibility of specific methods.”20 
The decision in Daubert caused confusion beyond inconsistences in the way experts were 
handled.  With the advent of the court’s factor-weighing test, some academics renewed questions 
regarding the classification of psychological expertise.  These questions emerged as “differences 
of opinion as to whether psychological expert testimony…should be classified as "scientific" or 
as "other specialized knowledge.”21  Further, some argue that a strict adherence to Daubert, 
disproportionality limits the defense as the burden of production with state of mind evidence is 
routinely placed on the defense.22  The argument follows that a defendant’s argument regarding 
mental state is often “closer to social constructions than objective facts” and that a strict reading 
of Daubert would make it harder for such “soft sciences” to find their way into court.23   
One concern in the context of Daubert is the lack checks stemming from the adversary 
system.  As competency is determined largely by a court-appointed expert, the idea that opposing 
experts could rebut any presumption is lacking.  Therefore, the role of the judge as gatekeeper is 
even more important than in other contexts.  
 
Training and Credentialing 
 Daubert unquestionably altered the landscape for forensic mental health experts.  While 
its effect deals in broader, discipline-wide determinations, it also should raise issues as to the 
 
20 Rogers, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice J Am Acad 
Psychiatry Law 37, 451 (2009) 
21 Goodman-Delahunty, Forensic Psychological Expertise in the Wake of Daubert, Law and 
Human Behavior, Vol. 21, 125 (1997) 
22 Slobgin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases, Seton Hall Law Review, 34 109 (2003) 
23 Id. at 110 
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validity of individual experts.  The role of a forensic psychologist, whether in the competency 
setting or with insanity and similar defenses, is fundamental to the judicial process.  The 
testimony given is of an exceeding specialized nature.  “Research suggests that forensic 
psychology is a discrete, unique body of knowledge that is not mastered by the majority of 
mental health clinicians in general practice.”24  In light of this specialization, experts should be 
drawn, not from the clinical community as a whole, but from the ranks of those versed in this 
“discrete, unique body of knowledge.”25  Whether a result of scarcity in specialized professionals 
or by some oversight by courts, this is not the case.  Instead, “most of the psychologists and 
psychiatrists providing services to courts have come from the ranks of professionals who have 
not graduated from special forensic training programs.”26  Therefore, experts who employ 
techniques or theories which may be acceptable under Daubert are being allowed to participate, 
whether through testimony or in competency reports, despite a lack of expertise in those 
particular techniques or theories.   
 This issue is caused, in large part, by a scarcity in both specialized training programs, and 
individuals who have reached some level of proficiency in forensic psychology.27  However, 
inconsistent credentialing standards also play a part.  Looking at those individuals allowed to 
serve as court ordered experts, states have taken two approaches.  To either statutorily create and 
require some form of credentialing whereby the state certifies that an individual is qualified, or 
by leaving the decision to judges to ensure that a given expert has some level of expertise.28  In 
 
24 Otto, Training and Credentialing in Forensic Psychology, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 
Vol. 8, 218 (1990) 
25 Id 
26 Id. at 225 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 227 
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either case, credentialing should be seen as a threshold issue and not replace the judge’s unique 
role as a gatekeeper.29 
 Credentialing also exists at the national level.  The American Board of Forensic 
Psychology, in concert with the American Board of Professional Psychology, acts as the national 
credentialing body.  Candidates undergo vigorous testing and are subjected to a wide variety of 
other educational and experiential requirements.30  However, a very small number of individuals 
have achieved national certification from the American Board of Forensic Psychology.31  The 
vast majority of experts have not achieved this level of accreditation.32  Even assuming the rare 
occasion where a psychological expert has achieved national accreditation, there is little to 
suggest that, despite the rigorous process, these experts are more qualified than others in the 
field.33  In fact, no empirical study has been conducted to demonstrate the value of the American 
Board of Forensic Psychology’s credentialing process.34   
 Relying on an untested process for accreditation raises obvious concerns.  The fact that 
nothing has been presented to validate the results of ABFP evaluations suggests that such 
evaluations could be arbitrary results independent of an individual defendant’s condition.  
Further, the use of standardized evaluations presents a parallel predicament.  While uniformity 
encourages consistent results, blindly implementing a predestined test could fail to meet a 
defendant’s particular situation; some tests may be better served for certain mental illnesses than 
others.           
 
29 Id. at 228 
30 Id. at 229 see also American Board of Forensic Psychology https://abfp.com/about/ 
31  Id.  
32  Id. 
33  Id.  
34  Id.  
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 Despite a lack of demonstrable value, board certification holds a lofty place in the 
purview of states.  States which do not require independent credentialing place weight on such 
accolades, while the lack of empirical evidence of value is likely overlooked or unknown.35  In 
fact, some states go as far as to statutorily mandate board certification from the American Board 
of Forensic Psychology for its competency experts.36  Again, issues can be raised as to the value 
of this certification.   When examining the problem through the lens of Daubert, it becomes clear 
that despite the judge’s renewed power as gatekeeper, confusion can arise as to the veracity of a 
proposed expert’s testimony.  This is especially true of instances in which a defendant’s 
competency to stand trial is at issue and the court itself provides the examining expert. 
 
Competency Standard 
 Determinations of a defendant’s competency to stand trial have long been critical in due 
process analysis.  Courts have also held that failing to seek a competency hearing in certain 
circumstances constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.37  Practically speaking, such 
determinations are made based on the report of an expert who has examined the defendant- 
“most states requires that the examining psychologist provide the court with written signed 
reports of their findings, which address whether the individual is competent to stand trial.”38  The 
Supreme Court has held that trying an incompetent defendant violates due process.  In 1960, the 
Court defined competency, stating that in order for a defendant to be competent to stand trial 
they must have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
 
35 Id. at 228 
36  E.g. Alaska Stat. § 12.47.070 
37 Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1997)  
38 Kaplan, The Forensic Psychology Report, ABA (2018)   
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rational understanding” while also looking to “whether he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.”39  Congress codified the Court’s definition of 
competency saying a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if the defendant is found to 
“presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to 
the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against 
him or to assist properly in his defense.”40   
Subsequent cases expand on the method through which such a determination is made.   
This determination requires the aide of experts in the field.  “First, when the court appoints a 
psychiatrist under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, the psychiatrist, even if he may have hitherto acted in a 
personal relationship, should now consider himself an officer of the court, not responsible to 
prosecution or defense. Second, the expert appointed should have a substantial opportunity to 
observe the accused, and prior to the hearing required by section 4244, should file with the court 
a written report summarizing his observations and indicating whether he thinks the accused 
competent within the meaning of Dusky v. United States.”41   
 
Issues with Dusky 
The first portion of the 1st Circuit’s interpretation opens up questions about ethical issues.  
The initial issue arises in instances where a defendant involved in a competency dispute has 
previously had contact with a medical health professional.  Had the defendant seen a psychiatrist 
or psychologist previously, the court could seek the aide of that psychiatrist or psychologist in 
making a competency determination.  In this context and others where records or testimony of 
 
39 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) 
40 18 USCS § 4241 
41 In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir. 1970), see Dusky 
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professionals who have previously seen a defendant are sought, obvious confidentiality issues 
abound.42  The American Psychological Association (APA) has attempted to address the issue by 
providing materials and continuing education programs on the subject.43  However, much 
confusion remains.44 
The second portion of the 1st Circuit excerpt begins by decreeing that the expert should 
have “a substantial opportunity to observe the accused.”45  No clarification has been given on 
what constitutes a substantial opportunity, leaving more room for inconsistent rulings on 
competency.  More concerning is the responsibility the court places on the expert.  In requiring 
an expert who evaluates a defendant’s competency to include whether they “think the accused 
[is] competent within the meaning of Dusky v. United States” the first circuit creates a tenuous 
situation.  As an initial matter, it is well grounded that the testimony of an expert witness should 
not extend to the “ultimate issue,” particularly in cases of state of mind.46  Here the Court 
requires that experts make ultimate conclusions regarding competency.  This is complicated by 
the actual standard articulated by statute and in both Dusky and Harmon.  Competency requires 
that a defendant understand the proceedings and consequences while ably participating in their 
own defense.  While diagnosing falls squarely within the expert’s criteria, making such 
determinations seemingly does not.   Here, what is essentially a medical diagnosis is required to 
include the defendant’s ability to assist in their own defense and understand the proceedings.  
 
42APA, Protecting Patient Privacy When the Court Calls, APA Continuing Education Vol. 47, 7 
(2016) 
43 Id.  
44 Zur, Subpoenas and How to Handle Them: Guidelines for Psychotherapists and Counselors, 
Zur Institute  
45 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) 
46 See United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997) 
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Traditionally, the clinical bases of forensic psychology were ill equipped to address such 
issues.47   
The Dusky standard is problematic in requiring non-medical opinion from a medical 
expert.  It raises ethical issues in the use of non-affiliated, court-appointed experts.  It has also 
been “criticized for both its brevity and ambiguity by mental health professionals and legal 
scholars alike.” 48 Brevity issues speak to the open-endedness of the decision; questions abound 
as to what level of “aid” the defendant must be capable of providing and to what extent the 
defendant can understand proceedings.  There are also concerns as to inconsistences brought on 
by its open-ended nature.  “Despite these concerns, the Dusky standard, or some variation of it, 
has been adopted by every state in the United States.”49  While there exists a possibility for 
inconsistencies in determinations based on the circumstances, there is, at least, a consistency 
across jurisdictions.  
While diagnosing a “mental disease or defect” presents its own challenges, the difficulty 
for courts, and pertinently experts, comes from the other statutory requirements.  Determining an 
individual defendant’s ability to a) comprehend the nature and consequences of proceedings, and 
b) assist in their own defense, 50  can prove to be incredibly troublesome. A defendant have “a 
reliably diagnosed mental disorder within the psychotic spectrum (e.g., paranoid schizophrenia), 
or may have a substantial physical illness that affects mental capacity (e.g., advanced cerebral 
arteriosclerosis) or may even have total amnesia for the events surrounding the alleged crime, 
 
47 Rogers, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice J Am Acad 
Psychiatry Law 37, 451 (2009) 
48 Pirelli, A Meta-Analytic Review of Competency To Stand Trial Research, 17 Psych. Pub. Pol. 
And L. 1, 2 (2011) 
49 Id 
50 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) 
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and still be found competent to stand trial.”51  Part of the issue comes from the well-established 
idea that competency, unlike insanity, is relevant at the time of trial rather at the time the crime 
was committed.  Therefore a defendant could be suffering from a mental illness at the time the 
crime was committed and be competent, or be competent at the time of the crime but 
incompetent to stand trial due to later developments.   
In response, psychological experts could base examinations on the statutory language.  
Devising some criteria whereby an expert, and by extension the court, could evaluate an 
individual’s illness with specific emphasis on comprehending proceedings and aiding in their 
defense would simplify matters.52  This is not the case.  “Oftentimes, experts do not base their 
evaluations on competency criteria.  Instead, fitness for trial is equated with the absence of 
symptoms of major psychiatric disorders.”53  By evaluating for symptoms, competency 
determinations miss out on the bulk of the statutes requirements.  Identifying symptoms does not 
speak to the defendant’s ability to assist counsel or comprehend proceedings.   
The open-endedness of the statutory language and associated holding, coupled with the 
reliance on experts to make final determinations could prove problematic.  Some states have 
addressed this issue, laying out far more detailed criteria for competency.  New Jersey, for 
example, has codified competency in N.J.S.A 2C:4-4 which reads:  
 
51 Golding, Assessment And Conceptualization Of Competency to Stand Trial: Preliminary Data 
on The Interdisciplinary Fitness, Law and Human Behavior Vol. 8 323 (1984) 
52 Rogers, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice J Am Acad 
Psychiatry Law 37, 451 (2009) 
53 Golding, Assessment and Conceptualization Competency to Stand Trial, Law and Human 
Behavior, Vol. 8, 323 (1984) 
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a. No person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to 
assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the 
commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures. 
b. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand trial on criminal 
charges if the proofs shall establish: 
(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in 
relation to time, place and things; and 
(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends: 
(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense; 
(b) That there is a judge on the bench; 
(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a 
criminal charge; 
(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that 
charge; 
(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts 
surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was 
committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify; 
(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as 
to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter 
into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the 
consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon 
such entry of a guilty plea; and 
14 
 
(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his 
defense.54 
By enumerating what it means to “comprehend the proceedings” and “assist in one’s defense” 
New Jersey, like other states, allows for a more precise determination of competency.  This 
heightened awareness of the intricacies of competency determinations is evident in subsequent 
decisions.  In State ex rel J.C. the Appellate Division found an evaluation to be deficient despite 
its inquiry into the defendant’s ability to comprehend the proceedings and assist in their own 
defense, the original federally-appropriate Dusky standard.55  That examination, and subsequent 
expert report, included information regarding the Dusky factors and a determination that the 
defendant would be unable understand the proceedings and assist counsel.56 In fact, the 
evaluating expert testified that the defendant would not "be able to comprehend the information 
that -- is going back and forth during . . . [at] a hearing or a trial"; and "would not be able to . . . 
work with [defense counsel] or answer . . . questions or understand the gravity of it."57  Even 
still, the court held that the evaluator failed to consider the non-Dusky factors enumerated in 
2C:4-4 and reversed the trial court’s findings that the juvenile defendant was incompetent to 
stand trial.58 
While trying an incompetent defendant is a clear due process violation,59 it would be 
unfeasible to hold a hearing in every instance.  Instead, New Jersey places the onus on the court 
deciding that “if there exists a "bona fide doubt" regarding a defendant's competency to stand 
 
54 N.J. Stat. § 2C:4-4 




59 State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 435, 175 (App. Div. 1949) 
15 
 
trial, the court should hold a competency hearing.”60  Additionally, the court has placed 
particular emphasis on defense counsel to raise the issue of competency where appropriate given 
counsel’s unique ability to observe a defendant.61 
It is easier for an expert to make a determination on competency when given precise 
guidelines.  Further, the more precise language allows for the development of better tests for 
competency which could be administered universally.  Even still, as jurisdictions continue to 
adhere to the more general federal standard, concerns could be raised.  On a micro level, there 
are issues with case by case discrepancies in competency determinations given the broad 
language.  Looking more globally, there are concerns about the methodology used and the need 
for more precise evaluative tools. 
 
Evidence Based Testing 
In response to these and similar concerns, the field of forensic psychology has made 
strides in tailoring evaluations to their precise need.  So called “evidence based practice” has 
developed particularly in the area of competency.62  These approaches however, are not without 
their detractors.  While the use of these newer methods has increased in recent years, the field as 
a whole has been weary to adopt the practice in part due to “seasoned practitioners who see the 
possibility that their decades of experience will be devalued or even discredited by evidence 
based approaches.”63  Additional pushback has been felt as a result of perceived objectivity 
 
60 State v. Lambert, 275 N.J. Super. 125, 128 (App. Div 1994) see also State v. Spivey,  
65 N.J. at 37, 461 (NJ 1974) 
61 State v. Lucas, 30, N.J. 37, 74 (NJ 1959) 
62 Rogers, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice J Am Acad 
Psychiatry Law 37, 451 (2009) 
63 Id.  
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concerns stemming from the emphasis placed on payment and publication, rather than traditional 
clinical standards.64  Still others in the field object to the cost, both monetary and in terms of 
time, associated with evidence based tests for competency.65  Even still, the evidence based 
approach has spawned several discreet tests specifically for determining competency.66 
Twelve competency assessment instruments have been developed over the past 40 years 
intended to address a defendant's psychological abilities, ranging from informal checklists to 
structured, criterion--based scoring instruments:67  
1. The Competency Screening Test,68  
2. The Competency to Stand Trial Assessment Instrument,69  
3. The Georgia Court Competency Test,70  
4. The Computer-Assisted Determination of Competency to Proceed,71 
5. The Competence Assessment for Standing  Trial for Defendants with Mental 
Retardation,72  
6. The Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview,73  
7. The Fitness Interview Test,74  




66 Pirelli, A Meta-Analytic Review Of Competency To Stand Trial Research, 17 Psych. Pub. Pol. 
And L. 1, 3-4 (2011) 
67 Id. 
68Lipsitt, CST (1971) 
69 Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, CAI (1973) 
70 Briggs, GCCT/GCCT-MSH (1988) 
71 Barnard, CADCOMP (1991) 
72 Everington CAST-MR (1992) 
73 Golding, IFI/IFI-R (1993) 
74 Roesch, FIT/FIT-R (1998) 
75 Nussbaum, MFQ (1998) 
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9. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool--Criminal Adjudication,76  
10. The Mosley Forensic Competency Scale,77  
11. The Evaluation for Competency to Stand Trial--Revised,78 and  
12. The Test of Malingered Incompetence.79  
These tests, though not universally accepted, have at least some grounding in verifiable data.80  
However, the profession as a whole has been slow to adopt modern, uniformed, testing 
procedure.  Many tasked with competency determinations continue to utilize traditional methods 
of clinical evaluation, methods which were “designed to primarily measure broad psychological 
constructs (e.g., intelligence or personality)” and not competency as prescribed by statute.81  
 One of the earliest attempts at an evidence-based competency evaluation was the 
“Competency Screening Test.”82  The test consists of twenty-two open ended questions 
specifically designed to evaluate a defendant’s ability to comprehend proceedings, and assist in 
defense.83  The test questions were developed with six criteria in mind: (1)Relationship to one’s 
attorney in establishing a defense, (2) Understanding and awareness of the nature of the court 
proceedings, (3) Affective response to the court process in dealing with accusations and feelings 
of guilt, (4) Judgmental qualities in engaging in the strategy and evaluation of the trial, (5) Trust 
 
76 Poythress, MacCAT-CA (1999) 
77 Mosley, MFCS (2001) 
78 Rogers, ECST-R (2004) 
79 Colwell, TOMI (2008) 
80 Pirelli, A Meta-Analytic Review Of Competency To Stand Trial Research, 17 Psych. Pub. Pol. 
And L. 1, 4 (2011) 
81 Id. 
82 Lipsitt, CST (1971) 
83 Nottingham, A validation study of the Competency Screening Test. Law and Human Behavior, 
5, 331 (1981) 
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and confidence in the attorney, and (6) Recognition of the seriousness of the situation.84  
Questions like “when I go to court my lawyer will___” are scored from zero to three with scores 
added up and viewed holistically.”85  A score of twenty or lower results in a determination that 
the test-taker is incompetent to stand trial.86  Studies of the Competency Screening Test show it 
has significant interrater reliability and produces generally consistent results.87 
 Despite the advancements of evidence based testing, there is some concern that the 
existence of twelve discreet tests for evaluating competency shows its arbitrary nature.  It is safe 
to assume that different tests could yield different results for the same defendant.  This would 
mean that competency determinations, despite the across-the-board acceptance of Dusky, suffer 
from a striking lack of consistency.  The fact that a defendant could be competent under one test 
and incompetent when evaluated using another has serious due process implications. 
 The similarities between the tests could be used to assuage some of this concern.88  The 
twelve currently-employed tests are based on the same principle and vary only in the specific 
language of questions.89  It could be that minor differences would not yield different results.  
Another explanation could be the evolving nature of the field.  The Competency Screening Test, 
developed in 1971, was groundbreaking.  The subsequent eleven widely-used tests could be seen 
as evolutions of the original method.  However, the still widespread use of the original test90 
further complicates the issue.  If these, essentially similar, tests were just evolutions of the CST, 
 




87 Id. see also Nottingham 
88 Pirelli, A Meta-Analytic Review Of Competency To Stand Trial Research, 17 Psych. Pub. Pol. 
And L. 1, 4 (2011) 
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
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tweaked to better fit the changing field, some fears of inconsistency could be avoided.  But, the 
lack of a consensus, evidenced by the still in use CST, is still somewhat problematic. 
Even still, evidence based testing as a whole, seems to be an improvement.  The fact that 
these tests are specifically tailored to legal competency sets them apart from traditional 
diagnostic measures.  While traditional methods were developed independent of Dusky or any 
other standard; “Competency assessment instruments…address competence-related abilities 
directly per the relevant legal standard”91  
 Evidence based testing also does much to assuage concerns about the validity of certain 
experts.  In competency determinations, issues about training and credentialing take on an even 
more important role.  With court appointed experts the need for uniformity and verifiability are 
even more critical.  Before recent developments, uniformity and verifiability were scarce in the 
arena of psychological expertise.92  Few studies had been done on extant testing and 
credentialing of proposed experts and their methodologies.93  Studies which have been conducted 
show flaws in methodologies, particularly with an eye towards traditional clinical approaches.94  
By implementing uniformed, evidence based testing, experts could avoid this lack of 
verifiability.  Consistent methodologies would lessen the need for intensive credentialing and 
training, while adopting modern approaches to testing would do much to right the wrongs of 
flawed traditional models.  
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 Adopting evidence based evaluations does not solve the consistency problem however.  
The existence of different tests, each purporting to evaluate insanity and each based on Dusky, is 
on its own, evidence of inconsistency.  This places a burden on the field and on experts 
themselves to adopt methods which render uniform results.  This is compounded by the unique 
nature of available tests which, despite a general adherence to the codified standard set out in 
Dusky, do vary in their language.95  In a global sense, certifying bodies or the courts themselves 
could mandate a specific test be used instead of allowing the expert to decide.  Without such a 
uniform determination, “evaluators must be mindful when choosing which measure to use 
because of variability in their in their utility.”96 
The importance of the shift towards evidence based evaluations is made abundantly clear 
by the available data.  Early studies of emerging evidence based testing found consistent 
consensus among examiners utilizing the novel techniques.97  The same could not be said of 
traditional clinical methods, particularly in light of their typically non-criminal purposes.  
However, the availability of data on traditional evaluative methods is somewhat lacking, 
particularly in the context of some comparative analysis between such methods and emerging, 
evidence based testing.98  Even still, the development of tests based specifically on Dusky is a 
step forward.99  The fact that modern standards for forensic psychology encourage the use of 
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evidence based competency assessment but declines any professional mandate leaves Judges to 
fulfill their roles as gatekeepers of substandard methods.100 
 
Competency vs Insanity 
 While both competency and the insanity defense utilize the same type of expert, share 
evaluative tools, and touch on similar subjects, competency to stand trial is not the same as 
insanity.  Determinations of competency have little to do with the insanity defense, “since the 
standards are quite different.”101  
Just as competency is critical to due process, the use of an expert in defenses is 
constitutionally mandated.102  The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires that the 
court provide an expert for indigent defendants in insanity defense cases.103  However, the 
differences in standards and applications set the two apart.   
 The insanity defense is codified federally as the 1984 Insanity Defense Reform Act.104  
The Act standardizes the expert’s role, limits ultimate issue conclusions, and eliminates non-
insanity mental-health defenses.105  The federal rules of evidence further limits expert testimony: 
prohibiting an expert witness in a criminal trial from “stat[ing] an opinion about whether the 
defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime 
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charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.”106  However, neither the 
act nor subsequent case law sets a uniform standard for insanity.  Instead states have enacted 
various test for insanity based upon one of four general tests: the M'Naghten Rule, the Irresistible 
Impulse Test, the Durham Rule, and the MPC Test.  While the four differ in their specific 
evaluations, all four are similarly different from Dusky.  Dusky and competency in general look 
at the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings and assist in their defense.  Competency 
determines if a defendant can be tried fairly.  Insanity looks instead at the ability form criminal 
intent or comprehend one’s actions.  While an individual could theoretically be not guilty by 
reason of insanity and incompetent to stand trial, the tests differ.   
 The two are also set apart by the window of time which is evaluated.  While competency 
looks at the defendant’s state of mind at the time of trial, insanity is based on the state of mind at 
the time the crime was committed. 
Additionally, the two vary in their level of consistency across jurisdictions.  When 
evaluating competency, every court in the United States uses the Dusky test.107 The same 
uniformity is not present in insanity tests.  In insanity, both the substance of the test and the 
ultimate question at issue varies greatly by state.  This jurisdictional variance serves to limit what 
can and cannot be testified to by the defendant’s expert.  In Clark v. Arizona the Supreme Court 
held that a state’s limitation of evidence of an underlying mental illness to an insanity plea was 
not a violation of due process.108  In Clark, at trial, the defendant was disallowed from 
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introducing the testimony of a psychiatric expert to show that he lacked the requisite mens rea.109  
Instead, such evidence was limited to the context of an insanity defense.110  In upholding this 
limitation, the Court found that restricting such evidence to insanity did not violate due process. 
In Kahler v. Kansas, the Supreme Court recently held that due process is not violated 
when a state bars evidence of mental illness in the guilt phase of trial outside of challenging that 
a defendant had a particular intent.111  Contrasting with the federal system for insanity pleas, 
such a system essentially eliminates insanity as an option, forcing the defendant to instead 
challenge mens rea.  Based on the holding, states are free to institute a system directly opposite 
to that seen in Clark.  In such a system, evidence of mental illness remains the baseline; whether 
challenging intent or demonstrating insanity in its most common legal form, it is paramount that 
an expert can opine as to a precipitating, underlying condition.  However, in either test the 
existence of a condition alone is not sufficient.  Instead, expert testimony is needed to take the 
additional step of either negating intent or proving insanity based on the given state’s 
definition.112  While Kahler’s effects remain to be seen, the decision assuredly complicates the 
arena of psychological expert testimony.   
 Accepting the holdings in Clark and Kahler is to accept that states are free to define 
insanity however they wish, even going as far as to virtually eliminate the availability of the 
defense.  The holdings allow great variance between states.  They also create substantial 
inconsistencies in the examination, methodology, and eventual testimony required of 








expert becomes muddled.  A psychological expert who had examined a defendant could provide 
testimony showing that that defendant’s mental illness prevented them from intending a crime 
but not that it prevented them from comprehending right from wrong in Kansas, while the 
reverse is true in Arizona.   
 Competency is determined by a uniform test, employed in all jurisdictions.  Insanity 
varies greatly from state to state.     
 The issues experts face in the Daubert context also differ between competency and 
insanity.  Much of the concern with competency arises as a result of the fact that experts are 
appointed by the court, virtually unchecked by either party.  With experts testifying either in 
support of or against a particular defense, the adversary system does a great deal to cure such 
concerns.  Even still, a court appointed expert in a defense context would raise the same issues.  
When a party utilizes a psychological expert for the purposes of asserting or contesting a 
defense, their counterpart is exceedingly likely to present their own expert.  Assuming said 
experts are admitted under a consistent standard, and with the role of the factfinder to evaluate 
credibility, issues are less likely than in a competency setting. 
 While insanity may have more relevance with Daubert and standards for experts 
generally, many of the issues present in competency determinations are assuaged by the nature of 
the use of experts in the defense context.  Even still issues, particularly based on the interplay 








 Psychological expert testimony takes on a number of forms in the criminal realm.  
Whether testifying in cases of insanity or evaluating competency, participating as the expert of a 
party or at the court’s appointment, psychological experts need to consider a wide array of 
interests while being aware of potential pitfalls.  These experts fall into a difficult area in the 
post-Daubert era, an area in which, while some would read Daubert as limiting their 
applicability in court, their role has expanded.   
 In the competency setting, psychological experts have the somewhat unique ability to 
testify free of affiliation to either party.  In that role, the court’s position as gatekeepers becomes 
even more crucial.  Without the checks of impeachment and the overall nature of the adversary 
system, court appointed experts making competency determinations have far more freedom.  
Thus, it is the courts job to assure that these experts meet the standard set out in Daubert and 
solidified in state competency law.  The same is true of the expert’s methodology.  While a 
portion of this methodology has moved towards more modern, evidence-based testing, much of 
the field is still reliant on traditional standards.  Standards which could fall short of Daubert’s 
criteria.   
 In the context of defenses, psychological experts have a constitutionally mandated place 
in litigation.  Yet, with recent Supreme Court decisions, the exact nature of that role is unclear.  
Much jurisdictional variance exists as to what the expert can testify to, particularly in regards to 
insanity defense cases.  Still, the place of the expert is incontrovertible. 
